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Abstract
In recent years emerging and re-emerging infections, as well as the risk of bioterrorist events, have attracted increasing attention from
health authorities because of the epidemic potential that renders some of them a real public health challenge. These highly infectious dis-
eases (HIDs) are occurring more and more frequently in Europe, and despite the many initiatives in place to face them, many unsolved
problems remain, and coordinated efforts for dealing with HIDs appear mandatory. Whereas uncoordinated measures would lead to
only partial and poor responses to these emerging threats, networking represents a valuable approach to these diseases, in order to:
(i) ensure a rapid and effective response; (ii) stimulate complementarity and prevent duplication; (iii) promote international cooperation,
exchange of experience, good practice and protocols; and (iv) support the less prepared countries in the European Community.
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Introduction
Despite hopes to the contrary, infectious diseases appear
far from being defeated and continue to claim the atten-
tion of public health authorities. Particularly in recent
years, yet to be fully understood changes in the environ-
ment, increased movement of goods and persons, and the
local inﬂuence of global warming and other phenomena
concerning vectors and hosts, seem to have promoted and
accelerated changes in the presentation of old infectious
diseases and the development of new ones [1–3]. The
relevance of the ‘emerging and re-emerging’ infectious
diseases, usually deﬁned as ‘infections that have newly
appeared in a population or have existed previously but
are rapidly increasing in incidence or geographic range’, is
further noted by the WHO in its recent World Health
Report 2007 [4]. The WHO stressed that infectious dis-
eases are spreading faster and emerging more quickly than
ever before.
The Highly Infectious Diseases Threat
Some emerging and re-emerging diseases represent a real chal-
lenge because of their epidemic potential. Recently, many glo-
bal alarms involving infectious diseases—such as the anthrax
crisis in the USA, the emergence of SARS, the pandemic threat
posed by the highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza A (H5N1), and
the cases of imported or autochthonous viral haemorrhagic
fever (VHFs) in Europe—have highlighted the need to improve
preparedness for these highly infectious diseases (HIDs), also
in order to increase certain aspects of what is perceived in
many areas as an issue of collective and national security [5].
Emerging HIDs are of particular concern because they usu-
ally hit relatively unprepared public health systems, and appro-
priate diagnostic tests, vaccines, drugs, containment and
mitigation measures are frequently not available or not imme-
diately so. A similar situation could occur if a pandemic strain
of inﬂuenza virus emerges: several surveys conducted in Euro-
pean countries and in the USA have revealed many gaps in
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their preparedness plans, in particular in terms of making such
plans truly operational, in stepping up prevention measures
against seasonal inﬂuenza, in ensuring essential services, in
enhancing collaboration with adjacent countries, and in
extending and better directing inﬂuenza research [6–8].
The European Community Policies for
Facing HIDs
Research on emerging infectious diseases has been funded since
the inception of the European Union (EU) Framework Pro-
grammes (FP) for Research in 1985. In 2002 the EU developed
recommendations for early diagnosis and management of bio-
terrorism-related infections, with the aim of providing member
states with a common basis for dealing with these diseases [9].
Among activities/projects covered in the FP6 2002–2006,
more than half are focused on various aspects of inﬂuenza,
which makes the Commission’s FPs arguably the single larg-
est funding source for inﬂuenza research in Europe. The
other topics covered include: VHFs, SARS, transmissible
spongiform encephalopathies, food- and water-borne dis-
eases, other zoonoses, as well as issues such as preparedness
and capacity building for different diseases in a more generic
fashion. In total, both inﬂuenza research and research on
other emerging infectious diseases have received more than
€100 million of EU funding each since 2002. A complete
searchable list and short descriptions of all projects, grouped
into different categories (as well as a downloadable pdf ver-
sion) is available online [10].
Concurrent with the increasing awareness of the threat of a
new inﬂuenza pandemic, the current FP7 2007–2013 intro-
duces for the ﬁrst time a speciﬁc area dedicated to ‘Potentially
new and re-emerging epidemics’, specifying that its ‘focus will
be on confronting emerging pathogens with pandemic poten-
tial including zoonoses’. The term ‘Potentially new and
re-emerging epidemics’, which is uncommon in the scientiﬁc
literature, refers mainly to those emerging viral diseases of
current or future relevance for Europe. This new mandate to
cover research systematically in the area of emerging epidem-
ics establishes a focal point within the FP from which calls for
proposals in this area can be strategically planned.
The past calls in the area of emerging and re-emerging
infectious diseases were frequently published ad hoc, in
response to speciﬁc threats, and the lack of a dedicated area
was responsible for the limited coordination and long-term
planning. The new mandate in FP7 speciﬁcally dedicated to
diseases should overcome these problems. Although research
on inﬂuenza will continue to receive support in view of the
magnitude and likelihood of an inﬂuenza pandemic, future calls
will increasingly build a strategic European research capacity
for other emerging and re-emerging HIDs.
HIDs in Europe: Recent Experiences and
Needs Emerging
A deﬁnition of HIDs and the agents/diseases included are
summarized in Table 1. Several cases of these diseases have
been reported in Europe since 2000: 32 cases of SARS were
imported in eight countries, and approximately 15 imported
conﬁrmed or suspected cases of VHFs have been reported,
mainly Lassa fever [11–14]. Very recently, two isolated cases
of Lassa fever have been diagnosed in London in travellers
who returned to the UK from Nigeria and Mali [15,16], and
several cases of autochthonous Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic
fevers have been reported in the European region (in Turkey
and in some states in the Balkans) and in some countries
within the EU (Bulgaria and Greece) [17,18].
No human cases of highly pathogenic Inﬂuenza A (H5N1)
virus have occurred in Europe, but two suspected cases were
managed in the Netherlands and Belgium, and public health
authorities in Greece faced a pseudo-outbreak [19–21].
Moreover, several recent cases of cowpox infections have
been reported recently in Europe: 18 conﬁrmed cases in Ger-
many, one suspected case in the Netherlands, ﬁve conﬁrmed
and seven suspected cases in France. Although human cow-
poxvirus infections are not classiﬁed as HID, these cases are
worth mentioning here as an example of how an unexpected
agent can disseminate rapidly. Some of the cases described
above were proven to be caused by the same virus, indicating
exposure to a common source of infection related to an inter-
national trade in pet rats by a Czech rat breeder [22].
Two cases of human infection with an orthopoxvirus,
similar to but distinct from cowpox, have been identiﬁed in
TABLE 1. Deﬁnition of highly infectious disease (HID), and
list of agents/diseases deﬁned as highly infectious
A HID
Is transmissible from person to person
Causes life-threatening illness
Presents a serious hazard in healthcare setting and in the community,
requiring speciﬁc control measures
The diseases/agents listed as HIDs are
Human-to-human transmissible viral haemorrhagic fevers (Marburg,
Ebola, Crimean Congo, Lassa and South American Haemorrhagic
fever – Junin, Machupo, Sabia, and Guanarito – viruses)
SARS Co-V
Emerging highly pathogenic strains of inﬂuenza virus
Smallpox and other orthopox infections (e.g. monkeypox, but excluding
vaccinia virus)
XDR-tuberculosis
Other emerging agents with similar characteristics, including engineered
agents for deliberate release
SARS-CoV, SARS-associated corona virus; XDR, extremely drug-resistant.
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north-eastern Italy in two veterinary doctors who had been
exposed to infected cats [23]. This ﬁnding, and the fact that the
two infections occurred independently of one another, under-
score the need to enhance awareness of zoonotic poxvirus
transmission (possibly endemic) also in regions where this
problem has not been addressed so far, e.g. the Southern Alps.
Almost all of the cases requiring isolation were ﬁrst admitted
to a general hospital without adequate isolation capabilities, and
later transferred to a high-level isolation unit. Despite the fact
that no outbreaks occurred in Europe, these experiences
exposed weaknesses in terms of recognition, public health
response, and diagnostic and clinical management. Indeed,
despite the wide availability of national and international plans
and guidelines, their application in ‘real-life’ scenarios remains
poor. Not surprisingly, public health policies and diagnostic and
clinical approaches to HIDs differ widely among European
countries, and a common platform that would enable scientists
to respond in a quick and powerful manner is still lacking.
Networking: a Valuable Approach
HIDs require multidisciplinary expertise. Experts in microbi-
ology (especially virology), public health, epidemiology, infec-
tious diseases, and communication need to work together to
respond to such incidents. For HIDs in particular, because of
the rarity of their occurrence, strong collaboration and
exchange of data, and attention to lessons learned from pre-
vious episodes, are advisable. For these reasons, creating
new networks and enhancing those functioning well should
be strongly promoted, in order to:
1 ensure a rapid and effective response to health threats
deriving from natural infection by or deliberate release of
HID agents;
2 stimulate complementarity and prevent duplication;
3 promote international cooperation, exchange of experi-
ence, good practice and protocols;
4 support the less prepared countries in the European
Community.
Added Value of Networking for HIDs: Basic
and Translational Research Issues
A continuous effort is necessary for sustaining and promoting
research on HIDs, whether basic or translational, in order to
promote the increase of general knowledge concerning on these
issues and to support the development of new tools for facing
them in an effective manner. The development and reﬁnement
of new diagnostic tests, new therapeutics and innovative vac-
cines is mandatory as never before. The use of networking and
international partnership could represent the successful strat-
egy in this context. The traditional boundaries between basic
science and clinical medicine should be dropped, and through
effective networks the few HID events that occur worldwide
should be studied thoroughly. A network of top-quality scien-
tists and clinicians will provide the complementarity required
for the development of these new approaches. Moreover,
improved funding for research on HIDs could come from the
involvement of networks in the private sector, which could be
encouraged to invest in this area because of the epidemic poten-
tial and the possible large-scale economic consequences.
Added Value of Networking for HIDs:
Public Health Issues
Early recognition and prompt reaction to HIDs rest upon ade-
quate preparedness, which should include the availability of
adequate infrastructures and speciﬁc training for healthcare
workers. Several differences exist among European countries,
due to government policies, as well as to pre-existing condi-
tions, and these may result in delayed and dissimilar public
health interventions and non-standardized training pro-
grammes. A better coordination of public health approaches
to HIDs may lead to standardization of interventions and pro-
tocols, such as the prompt isolation within structures with
adequate technical and logistic features, to the development of
a common core-curriculum, and substantial improvement in
the application of international health regulations. Moreover,
from a practical perspective, a network involving the main pub-
lic health institutes may play a key role in the management of:
1 a returning HID patient travelling through more than one
country (e.g. in the case of one or more connecting ﬂights),
in order to coordinate public health interventions;
2 an HID patient admitted in a country without adequate
healthcare settings for isolation (in this case, a cross-bor-
der transport by ground or air may be the most appro-
priate solution);
3 multi-country outbreaks.
Added Value of Networking for HIDs:
Diagnostic Issues
Due to the current perceived international security threats,
several EU member states are considering establishing
Biosafety Level (BSL)-4 diagnostic facilities. To improve and
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sustain the existing initiatives and networks aimed at pro-
moting collaboration among the existing BSL-4 laboratories
appears mandatory, as well as to provide assistance, through
these networks, to other European countries not equipped
with such sophisticated and costly facilities [24]. Moreover,
among the critical points identiﬁed in the context of the lab-
oratory diagnosis of HID agents are the scarcity of biological
samples to validate the diagnostic methods and the fact that
few commercial diagnostic tests are available for these
pathogens. Thus, a well-functioning network is essential for:
1 the sharing of diagnostic and research experience of the
currently operating BSL-4 European laboratories, as well
as diagnostic protocols, samples, reagents, and personnel
for training;
2 the review of current laboratory diagnostic capability for
HID agents;
3 the development of new hazard-free diagnostic tests suit-
able to be transferred to other non-BSL-4 laboratories;
4 the standardization of procedures for biosafety and bio-
security.
Added Value of Networking for HIDs:
Clinical Management and Infection Control
Issues
Intra-hospital procedures for clinical assistance and infection
control for HID cases represent ‘the core’ of managing
these diseases, and represent effective measures for HID
containment. On the other hand, hospitals may play an
important role in the ampliﬁcation of an outbreak if infec-
tion control measures are inconsistently applied. Conse-
quently, common protocols for infection control and
biosafety during the clinical and diagnostic management of
HIDs patients, based on the available evidence and on ‘real-
life’ experiences, are strongly advisable [25–28]. Moreover,
in order to offer to these patients the best available stan-
dards of care, a set of speciﬁc skills is required, and thus,
given the scarcity of these events, a functioning network for
expert consultation, second opinion, and scientiﬁc support
is needed.
Conclusions
As more and more persons, animals and goods move within
Europe, the need for improved and coordinated responses
to HIDs continues to grow. Furthermore, it is increasingly
recognized that HIDs can pose a signiﬁcant threat to each
country’s national security. Innovative research and coordi-
nated efforts, through the establishment of well-functioning
networks, are the only way to deal with these issues, in
order to improve preparedness and to react quickly: in
short, to be ‘prepared for the unknown’. A key role may be
played by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control, whose mission is, among others, to ‘coordinate the
European networking of bodies operating in the ﬁelds within
the Centre’s mission’ [29].
Uncoordinated measures can lead to only partial and poor
responses, and different approaches to similar health threats
in various EU countries are likely to negatively affect the
compliance by health professionals, and the perception of
the population. Although well-functioning networks are
already in place, many gaps still exist, as well as opportunities
for future collaboration. Fortunately, new scientiﬁc develop-
ments, and new perceptions of these health threats, make
this ﬁeld one of the most stimulating research areas with a
direct impact on the health of millions of people.
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